Reflections on the Arms Control Association’s Event, “Smarter Options for Nuclear Modernization”

Report

By Jack Moses 

On May 24, the Arms Control Association (ACA) organized the event “Smarter Options on U.S. Nuclear Modernization.” Panelists: Steve Fetter, the Associate Dean at the University of Maryland; Sharon Weiner, an Associate Professor at the School of International Service; and Amy Woolf, Specialist in Nuclear Policy at the Congressional Research Service, offered their views about the U.S. modernization program. 

 Most prevalent during the panel discussion was the idea of an incredible and unnecessary cost to nuclear modernization in the near future. Congressman John Garamendi – who offered a pre-recorded statement at the introduction of the webinar – described a cost of $1 trillion over the next 30 years for a modernization of the nuclear program. Weiner highlighted how the actual costs of a nuclear modernization program rarely follows the expected costs outlined to Congress.

Specifically, Weiner focused on the development of a lithium processing facility with an expected cost of $700 million that eventually rose to the price of $2 billion. With this excessive cost and increased time frame, the processing facility arrived on the Government Accountability Office’s List of Failure.

 This obscene cost to nuclear modernization has, however, rarely received pushback from American politicians. In general, defense spending is a rare area of bipartisan support in a gridlocked and hyper-partisan United States Congress. 

While increasing defense and nuclear spending appears to be a constant, we must question whether the funds may be better apportioned to pandemic relief, social welfare measures, and infrastructure development.

 The problematic idea that nuclear weapons must be held and developed to serve as a measure of deterrence dominated the conversation. A statement by moderator Kingston Reif perhaps best summarizes this viewpoint: “Modernization itself is not a question, but about how much.”

Yet, the panel of experts offered powerful and nuanced stances of nuclear modernization and development – it would be unfair to say that all individuals were bogged down in the idea of deterrence.

Citing Soviet-American Cold War negotiations, Amy Woolf relayed how the creation of nuclear missiles does not produce arms control agreements but rather a walkout of discussions. Additionally, Woolf spoke of how the START treaty cannot be seen as a ‘grand bargain’ for global powers but more as a mutually beneficial strategic maneuver.

But perhaps the most interesting development was the criticism of the American nuclear triad – land, air, and sea defense.

The problem with the land-based defense system, as outlined by Fetter, is how it forces the president to make an instantaneous decision to launch a silo-based ICBM missile. Instead of undergoing the expensive transition from the Minuteman 3 – the current ICBM missile – to the GBSD, Fetter recommends phasing out the Minuteman and eventually transitioning to a dyad system.

 The Arms Control Association’s Event was well put-together and insightful – the panel of experts provided strong critiques to the U.S. nuclear and defense policy. This panel provided refreshing perspectives as the majority of discussions, which I have attended, rarely question the exorbitant costs of the U.S. nuclear arsenal.